Is mandatory country-by-country reporting effective? - Early evidence on the economic responses by multinational firms by De Simone, Lisa et al.
ZEWpolicybrief
Lisa De Simone (Stanford University), Marcel Olbert (University of Mannheim)  
and Christoph Spengel (University of Mannheim and ZEW)
Is Mandatory Country-by-Country Reporting 
Effective? – Early Evidence on the Economic 
Responses by Multinational Firms
Over the past decade, policymakers, non-profit organizations, and the media have demanded 
greater transparency by multinational firms regarding their global operations and tax payments. 
These demands are motivated by the assumption that multinational firms engage in aggressive 
planning strategies to minimize their global tax bill, for instance through operations in tax havens 
and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. Accordingly, tax transparency is high on the political 
agenda. The political action resulted in the OECD proposal to require multinational firms to dis-
close their global operations and tax payments on a country-by-country basis to tax authorities. 
Since 2016, such country-by-country reporting (CbCR) is mandatory for firms operating in the Eu-
ropean Union. While the EU policymakers adopted CbCR primarily in response to perceived harm-
ful tax practices of multinational corporations, the effects of such increased disclosure on corpo-
rate decisions is an open but economically and politically relevant question as firms might not 
only alter their tax strategies but also change their real global footprint in terms of investment in 
assets or employees.
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 ͮ A recent study by Lisa De Simone (Stanford GSB) and Marcel Olbert (University of Mannheim) 
finds strong empirical evidence that multinational firms began to close down tax haven op-
erations and shift real economic activity into European low tax countries in response to Coun-
cil Directive 2016/881 mandating CbCR since 2016.
 ͮ The results also suggest that aggregate growth in employment of multinational firms reporting 
more than €750 million in consolidated revenue decreases, while overall tax payments do not 
change. This finding indicates that firms expect higher future tax burdens or, at least, tax un-
certainty.
 ͮ Overall, the evidence suggests that private CbCR curbs the most aggressive forms of tax avoid-
ance (through tax havens). However, CbCR seems to have real effects that are potentially un-
intended by the regulators. Specifically, firms appear to allocate more economic activity to 
relatively low tax but non-haven countries. This result is alarming for countries like Germany 
staying behind in European tax competition.
The full research paper is available at SSRN:  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3398116 
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COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING ON THE OECD AND EU LEVEL
Through Council Directive 2016/881, the EU formally adopted CbCR on May 25, 2016 with an ef-
fective date of January 1, 2016. Country-by-country disclosures to tax authorities arose as a rec-
ommendation from the OECD/G20’s Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) initiative. This initia-
tive, started in 2014, is a multinational approach to combatting perceived harmful tax practices 
of multinational corporations. Within the EU, the CbCR requirement applies to multinational groups 
whose parent company is a tax resident of an EU country or if any group subsidiary is incorporated 
in the EU. Additionally, the parent firm’s consolidated revenues must exceed €750 million in the 
fiscal year preceding the reporting year, with the first reporting year being 2016. 
Figure 1 depicts the template for a CbC report published as part of European Council Directive 
2016/881. Firms falling under the scope of CbCR in Europe must report to the tax authorities sev-
eral indicators of country-level economic activity by each tax jurisdiction: unrelated party reve-
nues, related party revenues, total revenues, profit before income tax, income tax paid (on a cash 
basis), current year income tax accrued, stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of employ-
ees, tangible assets other than cash and cash equivalents. Firms must also provide a list of af-
filiated legal entities by tax resident jurisdiction, the country of incorporation of each entity if dif-




Figure 1: CbCR Template
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POTENTIAL RESPONSES BY MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
The EU adopted CbCR primarily in response to perceived harmful tax practices of multinational cor-
porations (Financial Times 2016; OECD 2013). Although tax authorities previously received signifi-
cant information about a multinational’s operations within their own jurisdiction, they had only 
limited visibility to the location and magnitude of economic activities, profits, and tax payments 
outside their jurisdiction. The intent of CbCR therefore is to provide tax authorities with several in-
dicators of country-level economic activity for every tax jurisdiction a multinational operates in to 
allow them to better make a high-level assessment of the tax practices of the firm (OECD 2015). 
While some of this information is publicly disclosed under local reporting rules in some jurisdic-
tions, the aggregation of these data across all tax jurisdictions was generally not available to tax 
authorities, and some information required by the reports (in particular for tax haven subsidiar-
ies) was typically not publicly available at all (OECD 2015).1 If CbCR disclosures are informative 
to tax authorities, reporting firms face an increased risk that the tax authority will be able to de-
tect and challenge tax avoidance activities. Firms could therefore reduce tax avoidance in response 
to CbCR. Evidence of reduced tax avoidance includes a reduction in the number of tax haven sub-
sidiaries, increased consolidated tax payments, and reduced evidence of tax-motivated income 
shifting. Further, firms could reduce investments if they expect higher tax burdens in the future 
as documented in the empirical literature on taxes and investment (see, e.g., Desai, Foley, and 
Hines Jr 2004; Djankov et al. 2010; Feld and Heckemeyer 2011).
There is also a different potential response that has been largely ignored in the policy debate. Mul-
tinational firms might engage in activities intended to better substantiate their existing tax avoidance 
practices in response to increased detection and enforcement risk (Hanlon 2018; Spengel 2018).
Spengel (2018) notes that the items required to report in the CbC disclosures resemble the typical 
factors that have been considered in the policy discussion on formulary apportionment. If firms ex-
pect tax authorities to use the information contained in the CbC reports to enforce the allocation of 
taxable income in line with formulary apportionment instead of the existing arm’s length principle, 
they might increase revenues, tangible assets, and employment in low-tax but non-haven jurisdic-
tions to better substantiate pre-tax profits allocated to these jurisdictions. These increased invest-
ments in non-haven low-tax jurisdictions could be made at the expense of incremental investments 
in high-tax jurisdictions. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF CBCR
The empirical approach in De Simone and Olbert (2019) is a regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
that exploits the size-based threshold of €750 million of the CbCR mandate, including firms with 
consolidated revenues in excess of the threshold in the year prior to implementation in the treat-
ment group, and firms with consolidated revenues below the threshold in the control group.
The study uses financial statement and ownership information from fiscal years 2016 and 2017 
on multinational groups operating in the EU from Bureau van Dijk (BvD) to analyze the effects of 
the CbCR regime on corporate transparency and economic activity of multinational firms both on 
an aggregate basis and on the level of a firm’s subsidiaries. In particular, the study links each 
1  Depending on the European tax jurisdictions’ procedural tax law, firms may have to inform tax authorities when acquiring or establishing 
ultimate majority ownership in foreign corporations in the year of the event (see, e.g., Par. II of Sec. 138 in the German General Tax Code 
(Abgabenordnung)). However, information on foreign subsidiary ownership is not disclosed on an annual basis. For example, if a German 
multinational acquired or established a subsidiary in a tax haven in fiscal year 2000, long before the OECD’s and EU’s progressive work on 
corporate tax avoidance, it would have reported this event to the German tax authorities in 2001 together with its corporate tax returns of 
fiscal year 2000. Since then, no further reporting was required. Also, the tax authorities generally have no knowledge about (tax haven) 
operations of other affiliated but not controlled entities of the same firm (i.e., if a French multinational firm has a German subsidiary and 
further tax haven subsidiaries not owned through the German subsidiary, the German tax authorities have no knowledge about this 
multinational firm’s tax haven operations).
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multinational firm in each year to their global subsidiaries through up to 12 levels of hierarchical 
structure (i.e., the consolidated firm as the parent entity and a maximum of 11 tiers of subsidiar-
ies). This approach tracks a firm’s global subsidiary ownership over time, including subsidiaries 
incorporated in tax haven countries, independent of whether financial information for these sub-
sidiaries are available. The final sample includes about 25,000 multinational firms from 95 coun-
tries with more than 121,000 European subsidiaries ultimately owned by these firms potentially 
falling under the CbCR mandate.
The empirical results provide strong evidence that firms affected by the CbCR mandate in Europe 
closed down tax haven subsidiaries. The economic magnitude of our results suggests that af-
fected firms close down at least one tax haven subsidiary, an economically strong effect given 
firms at the 75th percentile of the sample used for estimation have, on average, only between 
one and two tax haven subsidiaries. Aggregated across the around 1,700 firms in our sample, De 
Simone and Olbert (2019) estimate a closure of 850 to 5,100 tax haven subsidiaries by CbCR 
firms following implementation of the disclosure rule.
Further, the study finds that affected firms’ investments in employees grow 5 to 14 percentage 
points less relative to firms just below the CbCR threshold. This finding suggests that firms are 
expecting increased tax uncertainty or even a larger tax burden due to greater tax detection and 
enforcement risk following CbCR, thereby reducing investment overall. In stark contrast to the 
legislators’ goal, CbCR (if anything) seems to have a negative impact on consolidated corporate 
tax payments. 
Last, the authors provide novel evidence that firms indeed adjust their real economic activity af-
ter the introduction of CbCR (Hanlon 2018; Spengel 2018) based on two different outcome meas-
ures. Using subsidiary-level economic factors aggregated at the country level, the study finds that 
affected firms shift revenues and employees into European countries with below-median corpo-
rate income tax rates. There is also limited evidence of reduced investment in high tax countries. 
Using affected firms’ weighted-average tax rates faced by international subsidiaries, the study 
finds multinational firms’ subsidiaries report relatively more revenue, employees, and total as-
sets in European countries with relatively low tax rates. Specifically, the authors document a de-
crease of 0.5 to 3 percentage points in weighted tax rates for treated firms using revenue, em-
ployees, and total assets as indicators of economic activity. Consistently, firms also experience 
a significant decrease in tax-expense-weighted tax rates of 2.2 to 4.7 percentage points, suggest-
ing that tax bases (and thus, tax payments) increase in European low tax countries relative to high 
tax countries. Taken together with our other subsidiary-level results, these findings support the 
inference that firms subject to CbCR responded by allocating real economic activities to relative-
ly low-tax European countries.
POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the study suggest firms expect private CbC disclosures provide incremental infor-
mation to tax authorities, leading presumably to increased detection and enforcement risk. The 
novel evidence provided by De Simone and Olbert (2019) suggests that increased reporting and 
transparency provided by multinationals to tax authorities worldwide appear to have both in-
tended and unintended effects. On the one hand, firms plausibly cut back on their most aggres-
sive tax planning strategies by reducing tax haven operations, which is in line with the OECD’s 
and European Commission’s intention when proposing CbCR. On the other hand, the nature of 
the firm response in the form of increased investment in low-tax jurisdictions – plausibly to jus-
tify tax-efficient income shifting – might come at the cost of lower investment in high-tax coun-
tries within Europe. This real response is clearly not a favorable outcome for policymakers in coun-
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tries with high tax rates. Overall, the evidence suggests that increased enforcement could pressure 
high-tax jurisdictions within Europe to enter into the “race to the bottom” by reducing their tax 
rates. CbCR might thus be another driving force of within-Europe or even international tax com-
petition, as recently evidenced by the United Kingdom’s remarkable downward trend in corporate 
income tax rates since 2010 and the United States’ recent tax reform effective since 2018. 
The finding that increased monitoring by high-tax jurisdictions may not reduce tax avoidance in 
general but rather induces firms to take actions to better substantiate tax avoidance accomplished 
in non-haven low-tax jurisdictions has also implications for other regulatory shifts in the tax trans-
parency landscape. In particular, additional private mandatory reporting for intermediaries of 
cross-border transactions as recently required under the EU Directive on Administrative Coopera-
tion in the Field of Taxation (DAC 6, effective July 2020) might have further consequences beyond 
increasing tax transparency and reducing tax avoidance.2 Further, evidence that firms respond to 
private tax authority disclosures also suggests making such disclosures public may not be nec-
essary, as some proponents of public CbCR claim (European Commission 2016a, 2016b; Trans-
parency International 2016).3 
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